Unifying the French evidential construction *on di(rai)t que*[1]

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Abstract. The clause embedding, evidential constructions *on dit* (∼'one says') and *on dirait* (∼'one would say') differ in their meaning, in their compatibility with negation, and in the possible moods they embed. Both constructions were previously assumed to be distinct idioms, the former with an evidential reading, the latter, with an epistemic reading close to 'it seems'. In this paper, we propose that both forms are derived from the same core components, in particular, an evidential modal *dire* involving an accessibility relation which forces a homogeneity effect regarding the status of its prejacent in the accessible worlds. We then split the mood-negation puzzles into two subproblems, and show that both can be explained assuming that *on di(rai)t* constructions compete with structural alternatives varying in placement of negation, mood, and subject pronoun.

Keywords: evidentiality, mood, presupposition projection.

1. Background on the French evidential construction *on dit*

In French, *dire* ('say') can combine with the indefinite pronoun *on*, as shown in (1).

(1) On dit que Jo est malade.
ON say.3.SG that Jo is sick.

On may refer to a third person singular (2a) or plural (2b) individual, or to a plurality of individuals which includes the speaker, but never the addressee (2c).

(2) a. On a volé mon vélo! Le voleur a du opérer la nuit.
ON has stolen my bike! The thief has must operate the night.
'Someone stole my bike! The thief must have come at night.'

b. On a cambriolé ma maison! Ils ont du venir la nuit.
ON has broken-into my house! They have must come the night.
'People broke into my house! They must have come at night.'

c. Jo et moi, on est allés au cinéma, et j'ai adoré le film.
Jo and I, ON is gone to-he movies, and I-have loved the movie.
'We (Jo and I) went to the movies, and I loved the movie.'

In that case, *on dit* suggests that its complement clause (**prejacent** *p*) is likely to hold (Kim, 2004; Rossari, 2012; Dendale, 2022; Kronning, 2023). Specifically in (1), *on dit* (indicative present) implies that its prejacent (indicative too) results from hearsay, i.e. (i) people other then the speaker had access to evidence supporting *p*, and endorse *p*; (ii) the speaker did not have access to such evidence or does not fully endorse *p*. Point (ii) is supported by the possible continuation *but I don't agree* (adapted from Kim (2004)), in (20). (20) additionally shows that the embedded verb *has* to be indicative in the *on dit* construction.

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(3) On dit que Jo {✓est / ✗soit} malade, ✓mais je ne suis pas d'accord.
ON say that Jo {✓is.IND / ✗be.SBJV} sick, ✓but I NEG am NEG agreeing.
'People say Jo is sick, but I don't agree.'

(4) shows that *on dit* cannot be negated and retain the aforementioned reportive function.

(4) On dit **pas** que Jo {✗est[2] / ✗soit} malade.
ON say **NEG** that Jo {✗is.IND / ✗be.SBJV} sick.

2. Puzzles with Tense, Mood and Negation

2.1. The effect of matrix tense

On dit seems to get a different meaning when put in the *conditionnel* (glossed CND). In (5), the reportive dimension of *on dit* seems to be lost, in the sense that the speaker must have had evidence for *p* and endorses *p*, contradicting (**ii**).

(5) On **dirait** que Jo {✓est / ✗soit} malade, ✗mais je suis pas d'accord.
ON **say.CND** that Jo {✓is.IND / ✗be.SBJV} sick, ✗but I am NEG agreeing.
'Jo seems sick, but I think he is not.'

Morphologically, CND is a transparent combination of past imperfective and simple future tense markings. Semantically, CND normally expresses future-in-past or counterfactuality in the consequent of conditionals Iatridou (2000). Therefore, it is surprising that CND appears to affect the core semantics of *dire* in (5).

2.2. The effect of embedded mood

On dirait (CND), unlike its IND counterpart *on dit*, can be negated and in that case embeds either an IND or a SBJV clause. In the IND case (6a), the speaker can endorse the prejacent without a contradiction. The opposite holds in the SBJV case (6b).

(6) a. On dirait pas que Jo **est** malade, ✓mais moi je pense qu'il l'est.
ON say.CND NEG that Jo **is.IND** sick, ✓but I I think that-he it-is.
'Jo does not seem sick, but I think he is.'

b. On dirait pas que Jo **soit** malade, ✗mais moi je pense qu'il l'est.
ON say.CND NEG that Jo **be.SBJV** sick, ✗but I I think that-he it-is.
'Jo does not seem sick, but I think he is.'

The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. In section 3, we introduce our core lexical entry for evidential *dire*, and explain why negation in only possible in the matrix when the tense on *dire* is CND. In section ...

[1] *est* is grammatically fine (and *soit* borderline), but the sentence then means no one performs the speech act that amounts to saying *Jo is sick*. This is different from our target meaning, which does not highlight the speech act *per se*, but instead focuses on what kind of conclusions about the prejacent can be drawn from the available evidence.

3. Capturing the interaction between negation and matrix tense

Why is NEG+IND impossible in the matrix clause of (4) under a reportive interpretation, while NEG+CND remains acceptable in (6a-6b)? In this section, we suggest that (4), unlike (6a-6b), has a low-negation competitor expressing the same meaning, but in a way that better divides the labor between at-issue and presupposed material.

3.1. Evidential *dire* and its interaction with the conditionnel and negation

We start by defining the contribution of CND in (5) and (6). We take CND to be the realization of a covert evidential modal $\mathrm{M}_{\mathscr{E}}$, outscoping the whole sentence, as sketched in (7). (8) defines this modal operator $\mathrm{M}_{\mathscr{E}}$: it states that the prejacent holds for all world-event pair (henceforth **WEP**) $\langle e', w' \rangle$ compatible with the evidence received in $\langle e, w \rangle$ by the speaker of the utterance speech act e^*. (9) defines evidential *dire* (as opposed to speech act *dire*) and is inspired from Schlenker (2005)'s entries for clause-embedding verbs. The assertion of *dire* is very close in nature to that of the modal $\mathrm{M}_{\mathscr{E}}$; the only difference is that the accessibility relation it introduces is based on the subject's evidence, given an event e'' (free variable). *Dire* asserts that the prejacent holds for all WEP $\langle e', w' \rangle$ compatible with the evidence received by x in $\langle e'', w \rangle$. Additionally, we assume that *dire* carries the homogeneity presupposition (in gray) that the worlds-event pairs $\langle e', w' \rangle$ compatible with the evidence the subject gets from e'' coocurring with the speech act event e in w, should all support or all reject the prejacent (cf. (11)).

(7)



(8) $[\![\mathrm{M}_{\mathscr{E}}]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda \langle p, e, w \rangle.$
$\forall \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*}, e, w).\ p(e', w')$

(9) $[\![dire_{\mathrm{ev}}]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda \langle x, p, e, w \rangle :$
$e'' \sim_w e$ evidentially settles p for x in w.
$\forall \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(x, e'', w).\ p(e', w')$

(10) *Event co-occurrence.* $e'' \sim_w e$ iff e'' and e co-occur in w.

(11) *Evidential homogeneity.* e'' evidentially settles p according to x in w, iff the truth value of p is homogenous across the worlds evidentially accessible for x, given e'' in w, i.e.:
$\forall \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(x, e'', w).\ p(e', w') \vee\ \forall \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(x, e'', w).\ \neg p(e', w')$

(12) *Evidential homogeneity and negation.* Evidentially settling p amounts to evidentially settling $\neg p$. e'' evidentially settles p according to x in w, iff e'' evidentially settles $\neg p$ according to x in w.

Note that because *dire* takes a world-even pair (WEP) as intensional argument, and that both the world and the event are independently useful in different places in its lexical entry, we need to adapt the definition of the evidential modal to act on world-event pairs as well.[3]

[3]Also, it is worth mentioning that using WEPs deviates from Schlenker (2005)'s original proposal, which was quantifying over events, and introducing worlds dependent on them.

3.2. Capturing the infelicity of negated evidential *on dit* (IND) with pragmatic competition
Because of its presupposition, it can be shown that (4) ends up meaning that *all* worlds compatible with *on*'s evidence, are s.t. Jo is not sick – which is equivalent to the denotation of the low-negation alternative (4′).

(4′) On dit que Jo **n'**est **pas** malade.
ON say that Jo NEG-is.IND NEG sick.

To show this, we first compute the meaning of the high-negation variant (4), and then compute the meaning of the low-negation variant (4′).

$$\begin{aligned}
[\![\textit{on dit } p]\!]^{e^*} &= \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{on}]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w.\\
&\qquad \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ p(e',w')\\
(4) = [\![\text{NEG } \textit{on dit } p]\!]^{e^*} &= \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{on}]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w.\\
&\qquad \exists\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')\\
(4') = [\![\textit{on dit } \text{NEG } p]\!]^{e^*} &= \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{on}]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w.\\
&\qquad \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')
\end{aligned}$$

We see that (4) and (4′) are defined under the same conditions, i.e. when e'' is s.t. it settles the evidence in favor of p for *on* in w ($\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ p(e',w')$), or it settles the evidence in favor of $\neg p$ for *on* in w ($\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')$).

Additionally, (4) and (4′) end up having the same truth conditions. To show this, we assume the presupposition of (4) and (4′) is verified: $\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ p(e',w') \vee \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')$ (★); and we compute (4)'s truth conditions.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{(4) is true} &\iff (\bigstar) \wedge [\![\text{NEG } \textit{on dit } p]\!]^{e^*} \text{ is true}\\
&\iff (\bigstar) \wedge \exists\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!], e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')\\
&\iff \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*}, e'', w).\ \neg p(e',w')\\
&\iff [\![\textit{on dit } \text{NEG } p]\!]^{e^*} \text{ is true}\\
&\iff \text{(4′) is true}
\end{aligned}$$

(4) and (4′) are therefore equivalent. Why would the high-negation variant (4) be dispreferred then? Despite being equivalent, (4) and (4′) have different assertions: (4) is existential over the relevant set of evidentially accessible worlds, while (4′) is universal. These distinct assertions entertain different logical relations with the presupposed material (★): (4)'s existential assertion is merely compatible with (★),[4] while (4′)'s universal assertion entails (★). We use

[4]Saying *some* evidentially accessible worlds support $\neg p$, is compatible with saying *some* evidentially accessible worlds support p; in other words, (4)'s existential assertion does not necessarily verify (★).

this observation to argue that (4′) does a better job in dividing presuposition and assertion, than (4) does.

The general schema we are interested in is given in (13). In the diagrams, the oblique line separates p from $\neg p$ worlds. q-worlds are compatible with both p and $\neg p$ worlds, and strictly contain r-worlds. q- and r-worlds coincide when restricted to the p-area (i.e., are equivalent if p is accommodated), but are in a strict containment relation in the $\neg p$ area – in fact, r may not even overlap with the $\neg p$ area (cf. variant (b)). In our case, p corresponds to the evidential homogeneity presupposition (★), q corresponds to the existential assertion of (4), and r corresponds to the universal assertion of (4′). So, in our case, r is incompatible with $\neg p$; while q is (cf. variant (b)).

(13) $S : p.\ q$ vs. $S' : p.\ r$

$$\text{with} \begin{cases} p \wedge q \equiv p \wedge r \\ r \Rightarrow q \\ r \not\Leftarrow q \end{cases}$$



(a) Variant with $r \wedge \neg p \not\equiv \bot$ (b) Variant with $r \wedge \neg p \equiv \bot$

If the configuration in (13) holds, we suggest S' should be preferred over S, because the assertion of S' is less compatible with $\neg p$ (i.e. the undefinedness domain of both sentences) than S's assertion is. In other words, S' appears less misleading than S. This is formalized in (14).

(14) *Don't be misleading!* Let $S' : p.\ r$ and $S : p.\ q$ be two logically equivalent sentences. S' is less misleading than S, and as such should be preferred, iff $(r \wedge \neg p)$ asymmetrically entails $(q \wedge \neg p)$, i.e. $(r \wedge \neg p) \Rightarrow (q \wedge \neg p)$ and $(q \wedge \neg p) \not\Leftarrow (r \wedge \neg p)$.

In our case, (14) is equivalent to saying that (4′)'s assertion (r) should asymmetrically entail (4)'s assertion (q). But (14) gives a motivation for this result: if two sentences presuppose the same thing and assert the same thing granted their presupposition, then the last way to compare them from a pragmatic competition perspective is by looking at whether or not the assertions suggest the presupposition might not hold. The competitor whose assertion is the least confusing w.r.t. the status of its presupposition, i.e. the least compatible with the negation of its presupposition, should be preferred. In sum, (4′) is preferred because, unlike (4), its at-issue meaning (already universal) is not compatible with the negation of its presupposition. This in turn predicts (4) to be infelicitous under the evidential reading.

This discussion seems reminiscent of NEG-raising effects associated with verbs like *believe*. *I don't believe John is sick* implies its low-negation alternative *I believe John is not sick*, if it is reasonable to think the speaker is opinionated about John's health, i.e. either believes John is sick, or believes he is not. In other words, NEG-raising verbs with high negation are not blocked by their low-negation alternative, which seems to contradict our claims. We think this difference with our account of *dire* might be explained if we buy the idea that the opinionatedness assumption that is needed to get the equivalence between the high- and low-

negation forms in NEG-raising cases is either not a presupposition of the NEG-raising verb Fillmore (1963); Collins and Postal (2014); Gajewski (2012); Romoli (2013), or, maybe, a "soft"/"pragmatic" presupposition Bartsch (1973); Abusch (2005); Gajewski (2005) which is not subject to our pragmatic competition principle. DIG THIS: ARE THERE TESTS TO FIND OUT IF SOMETHING IS SOFT

3.3. Pragmatic competition spares negated evidential *on dirait* (CND)

Let's now see how the pragmatic competition account allows to retain the felicity of both negated *on dirait* variants in (6). The LFs of (6) involve two layers of modality, coming from *dire* and the modal $M_{\mathscr{E}}$ licensing CND (cf. the LF in (7)). We show that adding this layer ensures that (6a) and (6b) are not equivalent to their low-negation alternatives (6a′) and (6b′), and therefore, are not subject to the *Don't be misleading!* constraint in (14).

(6a′) On dirait que Jo **n'**est **pas** malade.
ON say.CND that Jo **NEG**-is.IND **NEG** sick.
'Jo does not seem sick.'

(6b′) # On dirait que Jo **ne** soit **pas** malade.
ON say.CND that Jo **NEG** be.SBJV **NEG** sick.
Intended: 'Jo does not seem sick.'

Starting with (6b): we notice that its low-negation alternative (6b′) is infelicitous, probably due to the absence of matrix negation to license the embedded SBJV (cf. competition argument in Schlenker (2005), and next Section). (6b′) is thus predicted to be fine due to the absence of competition.

What is really left to be analyzed is the competition between (6a) and (6a′). We start by computing the effect of the covert evidential modal $M_{\mathscr{E}}$ expressing CND on top of the core structure *on dit p*. We assume the presupposition of *dire* projects universally across the modal.

$$[\![\mathrm{M}_{\mathscr{E}}\ \textit{on dit}\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle :$$
$$\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![on]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w'.$$
$$\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*},e'',w').\ p(e''',w''')$$

We then add negation. The homogeneity presupposition allows to see the lower existential as a universal, just like in the computation of the truth conditions of (4) in section 3.2.

$$\begin{aligned}[\![\text{NEG } \text{M}_{\mathscr{E}} \textit{ on dit } p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle :& \\ & \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![on]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w'. \\ & \exists\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \exists\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*},e'',w').\ \neg p(e''',w''') \\ = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle :& \\ & \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![on]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w'. \\ & \exists\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*},e'',w').\ \neg p(e''',w''')\end{aligned}$$

And below is the computation of the low-negation competitor (recall that evidentially settling p amounts to evidentially settling $\neg p$). We end up with a doubly universally modalized statement, different from the high-negation one.

$$\begin{aligned}[\![\text{M}_{\mathscr{E}} \textit{ on dit } \text{NEG } p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle :& \\ & \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![on]\!]^{e^*} \text{ in } w'. \\ & \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*},e'',w').\ \neg p(e''',w''')\end{aligned}$$

Assuming *dire*'s presupposition (★) projects universally, (6a-6b) means that there is a WEP $\langle e',w'\rangle$ compatible with what the speaker has evidence for, s.t. *any* WEP $\langle e''',w'''\rangle$ compatible with the evidence *on* has access to from e'' co-occurring with e', is s.t. Jo is not sick. Crucially, double modality breaks the equivalence between (6a-6b) and their low negation alternatives (which are doubly universal on e' and e'''). (6a-6b) are thus predicted to be felicitous.

4. Capturing the interaction between embedded mood and speaker endorsement

Why can the speaker hold contradictory beliefs in (20-6a) but not in (5-6b) and why is SBJV only ok under negated *dire*? We assume:

1. **pronominal competition** between *on* (by default 1.PL=1.SG+3.INDEF) and *je* (1.SG) $\sqsubset$ *on*;
2. **mood competition** between IND, which presupposes the world under evaluation is in the Context Set (CS) of a salient speech act, and SBJV (presuppositionless) Schlenker (2005).

The licensing of SBJV . The presuppositions contributed by the embedded IND after universal projection in (20)&(5) are:

(15) $\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w).\ w' \in CS(\nu)$

(16) $\forall(\langle e',w'\rangle,\langle e''',w'''\rangle) \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w) \times \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w').\ w''' \in CS(\nu)$

With ν a salient speech act, typically $\nu = e$. (15) says that all the WEPs compatible with the evidence received by *on* are epistemically possible – which is easily satisfied. Following the

argument in Schlenker (2005), **SBJV in (20) is thus disfavored, as per *Maximize Presupposition!*** Heim (1991). Same holds for (16) modulo an extra layer of quantification

The pattern of speaker endorsement. We posit that if $x \sqsubset y$, then y may receive more evidence than x alone and so $\mathscr{E}(x,e,w) \supseteq \mathscr{E}(y,e,w)$. $\forall$ being downward-monotone w.r.t. its restrictor, replacing *on* with *je* in (20) then leads to a stronger assertion and presupposition By pragmatic competition, one may then derive that either the presupposition or the assertion of (20)[*je*/*on*] is false, i.e.:

1. **the speaker alone does not get enough evidence to settle whether or not Jo is sick;**
2. or some of the worlds compatible with that evidence are epistemically impossible (odd inference);
3. **or some of them are s.t. Jo is *not* sick.**

This derives the lack of speaker endorsement in (20). Likewise, replacing *on* with *je* in (5) leads to a stronger meaning, but due to the presence of an extra layer of universal quantification, the inferences derived by competition are weaker **Crucially, they leave space for WEPs compatible with the speaker's evidence to be s.t. the speaker endorses the prejacent**. Turning to (6a-6b), we do not have a full explanation for the observed contrast in speaker endorsement, but notice that replacing *on* with *je* in (6a) is fine, while doing so in (6b) is not. This is shown in (17)

(17) **Je** dirais pas que Jo {✓est / ✗soit} malade.
I say.CND NEG that Jo {✓is.IND / ✗be.SBJV} sick.

Thus, pronominal competition may affect (6a) but not (6b), potentially leading to a lack of speaker endorsement in the former, but not the latter.

5. Showing that SBJV is disfavored under negation in (20)&(5)

- Below is the presupposition we assume for IND (Schlenker (2005)). SBJV is assumed to be presuppositionless.

(18) $[\![\text{IND}]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda p.\ \lambda \langle e', w' \rangle : w' \in CS(v).\ p(e', w')$, where v is a salient speech act.

- And a reminder of Maximize Presuppositions! Heim (1991); **?**

(19) *Maximize Presupposition!*
If $S : p.\ q$ and $S' : p'.\ q$ with $p \Rightarrow p'$ and p is satisfied in context, then S should be preferred over S'

- For simplicity we ignore the effect of this presupposition on matrix predicates (*dit*/*dirait*); we focus on how this presupposition projects from the embedded clause and interacts with the semantics of the matrix predicate.
- The sentences (from the poster):

(20) On dit que Jo {✓est / ✗soit} malade.
ON say that Jo {✓is.IND / ✗be.SBJV} sick.
'People say Jo is sick.'

- Let's start with (20). We repeat the entry for *on dit p* from Section 1 and add embedded IND to it, assuming its presupposition (underlined) projects universally.

$$[\![on\ dit\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{on}]\!] \text{ in } w.\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w).\ p(e',w')$$

$$[\![on\ dit\ \text{IND}\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{on}]\!] \text{ in } w \wedge \underline{\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w).\ w' \in CS(\nu)} .\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w).\ p(e',w')$$

- The additional presupposition contributed by IND states that any WEP compatible with the evidence received by *on* in $\langle e'',w\rangle$ ($e'' \sim e$, settling p) is part of the context set of some salient speech act event ν (typically $\nu = e$ or e''), meaning, is epistemically possible given ν. If we assume that what is taken to be compatible with the available evidence is also epistemically possible (a.k.a.: "no crazy conjectures based on evidence") then, IND's presupposition is trivially satisfied. As a result, the IND-variant of (20) should always be preferred over its SBJV-variant. This kind of argument is closely following the ones made by Schlenker (2005) in non-evidential contexts. The argument might be a bit more shaky here though; it crucially depends on what we think should be included in a reasonable, evidence-based accessibility relation.
- Now turning to (5). We repeat the entry for *on dirait p* from Section 2 and add embedded IND to it, assuming its presupposition (underlined) projects universally.

$$[\![\text{M}_{\mathscr{E}}\ on\ dit\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ according to } [\![on]\!] \text{ in } w.\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w').\ p(e''',w''')$$

$$[\![\text{M}_{\mathscr{E}}\ on\ dit\ \text{IND}\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ according to } [\![on]\!] \text{ in } w.\ \underline{\wedge\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w').\ w''' \in CS(\nu).}\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!],e'',w').\ p(e''',w''')$$

- The only difference with the previous case is that the worlds that are epistemically possible (as per IND's presupposition) are compatible with the evidence *on* gets in WEPs that are themselves compatible with the evidence the speaker gets in a co-occurring event. The triviality of IND's presupposition remains, we think: worlds that are compatible with *on*'s evidence, given the speaker's evidence, should arguably not be unbelievable worlds.

6. Deriving speaker endorsement (or lack thereof) in (20)&(5)

- The sentences (repeated from previous Section and poster, with continuations):

(20)	**On**	dit que Jo est	d'accord.
	1.SG+3.INDEF	say that Jo is.IND	agreeing.
	malade, ✓mais je ne	suis pas	
	sick, ✓but I	NEG am NEG	'People say Jo is sick, but I don't agree.'

(5) **On** dirait que Jo est malade, ✗mais je suis pas d'accord.
1.SG+3.INDEF say.CND that Jo is.IND sick, ✗but I am NEG agreeing.
'Jo seems sick, but I think he is not.'

- (20) is compatible with a *I don't agree* continuation, which means it does not imply that the speaker endorses the prejacent. (5) is incompatible with such a continuation, which means the speaker endorses the prejacent.
- Below are competitors of (20) and (5) where the subject *on* (assumed to be 1.SG+3.INDEF by default) is replaced with *je* (1.SG). We thus have $[\![je]\!] \sqsubset [\![on]\!]$.

(20′) **Je** dis que Jo est malade.
1.SG say that Jo is.IND sick.
'I say Jo is sick.'

(5′) **Je** dirais que Jo est malade.
1.SG say.CND that Jo is.IND sick.
'I'd say Jo sick.'

- We posit that if an individual y contains another individual x, y should be able to get more evidence than x within any given WEP, and therefore, the set of worlds compatible with y's evidence should end up being *contained* in the set of worlds compatible with x's evidence, which leave more possibilities open. This is expressed in (21a) below, with the special case of *je* vs. *on* in (21b)

(21) a. $x \sqsubset y \iff \forall \langle e,w\rangle.\ \mathscr{E}(y,e,w) \subseteq \mathscr{E}(x,e,w)$
b. $[\![je]\!] \sqsubset [\![on]\!]^{e^*} \iff \forall \langle e,w\rangle.\ \mathscr{E}([\![on]\!]^{e^*},e,w) \subseteq \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e,w)$

- Below are the computations for (20′)&(5′), obtained from the last Section by simply replacing $[\![on]\!]$ with $[\![je]\!]$.

$$[\![je\ dis\ \text{IND}\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : e'' \sim e \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ for } [\![\text{je}]\!] \text{ in } w \wedge \underline{\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e'',w).\ w' \in CS}$$
$$\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e'',w).\ p(e',w')$$

$$[\![\text{M}_{\mathscr{E}}\ je\ dis\ \text{IND}\ p]\!]^{e^*} = \lambda\langle e,w\rangle : \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ e'' \sim e' \text{ evidentially settles } p \text{ according to } [\![je]\!] \text{ in } w'$$
$$\underline{\wedge\ \forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e'',w').\ w''' \in CS(v).}$$
$$\forall\langle e',w'\rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*},e,w).\ \forall\langle e''',w'''\rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e'',w').\ p(e''',w''')$$

- We see that each time a set of the form $\mathscr{E}([\![je]\!],e,w)$ is introduced, it is to universally quantify on it. Because $\forall$ is downward-monotone w.r.t. its restrictor, we then get:

(22) a. Presupposition(20′) ⇒ Presupposition(20)
b. Assertion(20′) ⇒ Assertion(20)

(23) a. Presupposition(5′) ⇒ Presupposition(5)
b. Assertion(5′) ⇒ Assertion(5)

- Now we are now making the (perhaps debatable) assumption that if two sentences S and S' compete and S has both a stronger presupposition and a stronger assertion, then S should be preferred over S'. If S' is used anyway, then it must mean that either the assertion of S does not hold (∼implicature), or its presupposition does not hold (∼anti-presupposition) – or both.

- If $S = (20')$ and $S = (20)$, we derive the following inferences for (20):

(24) $e'' \sim e$ does not evidentially settle p for $[\![\text{je}]\!]$ in w
~~$\forall\, \exists \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!], e'', w).\ w' \notin CS(w).$~~
$\vee\, \exists \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!], e'', w).\ \neg p(e', w')$

- We think the middle inference about a world compatible with the evidence not being epistemically possible, is unlikely (cf. previous Section). We are then left with an inference saying that e'' does not allow *je* to settle the prejacent (i.e. there are worlds compatible with *je*'s evidence that are p, and some that are $\neg p$); or, an inference saying some worlds compatible with *je*'s evidence are $\neg p$. In any case, the prejacent cannot be fully endorsed by the speaker in any world compatible with the speaker's evidence.

- If $S = (5')$ and $S = (5)$, we derive the following inferences for (5):

(25) $\exists \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*}, e, w).\ e'' \sim e'$ does not evidentially settle p according to $[\![je]\!]$ in w'
~~$\forall\, \exists \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*}, e, w).\ \exists \langle e''', w''' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!], e'', w').\ w''' \notin CS(w)$~~
$\vee\, \exists \langle e', w' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}(spk_{e^*}, e, w).\ \exists \langle e''', w''' \rangle \in \mathscr{E}([\![je]\!], e'', w').\ \neg p(e''', w''')$

- We discard the middle inference for the same reason as before. We are left with two doubly existential inferences, that give rise to something weaker: there is an event compatible with the speaker's evidence s.t. some co-occurring event e'' does not allow the speaker to evidentially settle p, or, s.t. p does not holds of the WEPs compatible with the evidence in e''. But this does not disallow another event to contraint e'' differently and allow the prejacent to be endorsed given the alternative evidence from e''. So we think this inference is not enough to allow a continuation of (5) of the form *I don't agree*.

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